Who Are the Houthis? The Zaydi History Behind the Headlines

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Key Takeaways

  • The Houthis emerged from Zaydism, a branch of Shia Islam distinct from the Twelver Shiism practiced in Iran, with its own theology, law, and political history.
  • Zaydi imams ruled much of northern Yemen, on and off, from the late 9th century until the 1962 republican revolution.
  • In the 1960s civil war, Saudi Arabia backed the Zaydi imam against Egyptian-supported republicans, a fact that complicates today’s “sectarian” framing.
  • The modern Houthi movement grew out of a 1990s Zaydi revival in Saada, partly as a reaction to Saudi-influenced Salafi preaching and to marginalization by the Yemeni state.
  • Iranian and Hezbollah support became significant later and is now substantial, but most specialists see the Houthis as a Yemeni movement with its own agenda rather than a creation of Tehran.

When the Houthis appear in the news, usually for missile strikes, Red Sea shipping attacks, or, in September 2026, the seizure of Mayyun Island in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, they are typically described in one line: an Iran-backed rebel group from Yemen. When they ask who the Houthis are, most readers get a geopolitical answer and little history.

That shorthand captures part of the present but skips the deeper past. The movement’s leaders, slogans, and sense of legitimacy draw on Zaydism, a tradition with a thousand-year political history in Yemen’s northern highlands. As Dr. Charles Schmitz of Towson University discussed on the Unraveling Middle East podcast, the Houthis are rooted in more than a millennium of Shia tradition in Yemen.

This piece traces that history through several perspectives: Zaydi revivalists, Yemeni republicans and Sunni Islamists, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and outside analysts.

What Is Zaydism? Not the Same Shia Islam as Iran’s

Zaydism is a branch of Shia Islam named after Zayd ibn Ali, a great-grandson of the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law Ali, who died leading a revolt near Kufa in 740 CE. Zaydis differ from Iran’s Twelver Shia on the imamate, theology, and law.

All Shia Muslims hold that leadership of the community, the imamate, belongs to the Prophet’s family through Ali. They differ over which line. According to Minority Rights Group, Zaydism recognizes as imams those descendants of the Prophet’s house who actively strove to assert their authority, if necessary through armed struggle.

That principle produced a distinctive political culture. Zaydis do not believe in the infallibility of imams, a core Twelver doctrine, and they do not await a hidden imam. In law, Zaydi jurisprudence has historically been close enough to Sunni schools that Zaydis and Shafii Sunnis in Yemen often prayed in the same mosques. The Minority Rights Group notes that relations between the two communities long tended to be relatively amicable.

EVIDENCE CHECK: It is common to read that the Houthis share Iran’s religion. They share a broad Shia identity, but Zaydism and Twelver Shiism differ on the nature of imams, on religious authority, and on law. Historically, Zaydis were often closer in practice to their Sunni Yemeni neighbors than to Iran’s clergy.

The Imamate: A Thousand Years of Zaydi Rule in the North

In 897 CE, a scholar from the Prophet’s lineage, Yahya ibn al-Husayn, known as al-Hadi ila al-Haqq, arrived in the northern highlands to mediate tribal disputes and founded a Zaydi state centered on Saada. Saada, as Lucas Winter writes in Middle East Policy, was the seat of Yemen’s first imamate and remained a center of Zaydi scholarship long after political power moved to Sanaa.

The imamate was rarely a single continuous state. Its authority expanded and contracted over centuries, competing with Sunni dynasties in the south and the coastal lowlands, and with the Ottomans, who occupied parts of Yemen twice. But with interruptions, Zaydi imams ruled the north until the 20th century. The last dynasty, the Hamid al-Din family, governed the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen from the end of Ottoman rule in 1918 until 1962.

The role of the sayyids

The imamate rested on a social hierarchy. Families claiming descent from the Prophet, known as sayyids or Hashemites, held religious and political prestige, and only they could become imams. Tribal confederations supplied military power. This hierarchy matters today: the Houthi family are sayyids, and critics argue the movement seeks to restore sayyid privilege, a charge Houthi leaders reject.

1962: The Revolution That Ended the Imamate

In September 1962, army officers inspired by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the new imam and declared the Yemen Arab Republic. A civil war followed until 1970, with Egypt backing the republicans and Saudi Arabia backing the Zaydi royalists.

The war’s alignments surprise many readers. Saudi Arabia, a Sunni monarchy whose religious establishment has been hostile to Shia Islam, supported a Zaydi Shia imam because it feared a Nasserist republic on its border far more than it disliked Zaydi theology. Egypt sent tens of thousands of troops to support the republic.

In the 1960s, Saudi Arabia went to war to keep a Zaydi Shia imam in power in Yemen.

The war ended with a 1970 reconciliation that kept the republic but brought royalist tribes into the system. Yet the end of the imamate, as Minority Rights Group observes, was followed by the marginalization of predominantly Zaydi northern areas such as Saada. The republic’s leaders, many of them from Zaydi backgrounds themselves, built a state that downplayed Zaydi religious identity and the sayyid class.

The Zaydi Revival: Saada, Salafism, and Hussein al-Houthi

The modern movement grew from a sense that Zaydism itself was under threat. From the 1980s, with Saudi funding and Yemeni government tolerance, Salafi preachers who followed a strict Sunni revivalist approach established institutes in the heart of Zaydi country, most famously the Dar al-Hadith center at Dammaj near Saada. The Minority Rights Group describes a rising tide of Sunni reformist propaganda against Zaydism in this period.

In response, Zaydi scholars and activists launched revival efforts in the early 1990s, including a youth network called the Believing Youth (al-Shabab al-Muminin), which ran summer camps and religious study circles. One of its leading figures was Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, son of a prominent Zaydi scholar.

Hussein al-Houthi took the movement in a more political direction. According to Baraa Shiban, a RUSI fellow and critic of the group, quoted by Semafor, Hussein visited Iran in 1995 and afterward fused Zaydi tradition with ideas drawn from Iran’s revolutionary model. After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, his followers adopted a slogan denouncing America and Israel, and he criticized the Yemeni government’s cooperation with Washington.

The Saada wars

In 2004, the government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh moved to arrest him. Hussein al-Houthi was killed that year, and leadership passed to his brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. Six rounds of war between the government and the movement followed until 2010. As Minority Rights Group records, a Qatari-brokered agreement in 2007 quickly collapsed, with each side blaming the other. The fighting, much of it destructive for Saada’s civilians, deepened local support for the Houthis in the north.

An Iranian Creation? What the Timeline Shows

The Houthis were not created by Iran. The movement grew from Yemeni religious and political grievances in the 1990s and 2000s. Iranian and Hezbollah support grew mainly after 2011 and especially after 2015, and specialists disagree about how much influence that assistance buys Tehran.

The proxy framing has real evidence behind it today. Yemen analysts cited by Al-Monitor describe training by Iran and Hezbollah as critical to the Houthis’ military rise, and the group’s missiles and drones closely match Iranian designs. Reporting in New Lines Magazine traces a two-decade Hezbollah effort to shape the movement.

Other scholars emphasize the limits of that influence. Some analysts point to occasions when the Houthis reportedly acted against Iranian preferences, including accounts that Tehran counseled caution before the 2014 push into Sanaa. They appear to make their decisions about war and peace with Saudi Arabia and with Yemeni rivals in Saada and Sanaa. The Wilson Center notes that critics allege the goal is a Zaydi theocracy led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, a domestic ambition rather than an Iranian one.

EVIDENCE CHECK: “Iran created the Houthis” is a myth; “Iran has nothing to do with the Houthis” is also a myth. The evidence supports a partnership that deepened over time between a Yemeni movement with Zaydi revivalist roots and an Iranian state seeking allies against Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States.

From Saada to Sanaa to the Red Sea

The 2011 Arab Spring protests weakened Saleh, and the Houthis joined Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference in 2013. In September 2014, allied with their former enemy Saleh, they seized Sanaa and overthrew the internationally recognized government. In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition intervened, beginning a war that produced one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Each side blames the other for that catastrophe, and independent investigators have documented serious abuses by multiple parties.

The movement, which calls itself Ansar Allah (“Supporters of God”), now controls most of Yemen’s population, though not most of its territory. Since late 2023, it has attacked shipping in the Red Sea, citing solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, and fired missiles and drones toward Israel. In September 2026, according to the American Jewish Committee, it seized territory on Yemen’s Red Sea coast and Mayyun Island in the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Analysts writing in Fair Observer argue that with Hezbollah weakened and Syria’s Assad government gone, the Houthis are now one of Iran’s last strong partners in the region.

Zaydism and the Houthi movement are still not the same thing. As Minority Rights Group stresses, while Zaydis make up the majority of Houthi followers, not all Zaydis are Houthis. Many Zaydi families, tribes, and scholars oppose the movement, and some have suffered at its hands.

Why It Still Matters

Treating the Houthis only as an extension of Iran makes their behavior hard to predict. Their sense of legitimacy, their hostility toward Saudi-backed Salafism, their emphasis on sayyid leadership, and their willingness to absorb enormous punishment all make more sense against the backdrop of the Zaydi imamate, the 1962 revolution, and the Saada wars.

The history also cautions against the opposite mistake: assuming religion explains everything. Yemen’s alliances have shifted repeatedly across sectarian lines, from Saudi support for the imam in the 1960s to the Houthi-Saleh partnership in 2014. Reading Yemen news with that background means asking what local interests, not just regional patrons, are driving each move.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who are the Houthis? The Houthis are a Yemeni political and armed movement, formally called Ansar Allah, that emerged in the Saada region in the 1990s and 2000s. Named after the al-Houthi family, it draws its religious identity from Zaydi Shia Islam and has controlled Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, since 2014.

What is Zaydi Islam? Zaydism is a branch of Shia Islam named after Zayd ibn Ali, who died in 740 CE. It differs from Twelver Shiism, the majority faith in Iran, by not treating imams as infallible and by accepting any qualified descendant of the Prophet’s family who actively claims leadership.

Are the Houthis an Iranian proxy? Specialists disagree on the label. Iran and Hezbollah provide weapons, training, and support that have been critical to the group’s military power, but the movement has Yemeni origins and its own local goals, and it has sometimes acted independently of Tehran.

When did the Zaydi imamate end? The Zaydi imamate, which ruled northern Yemen with interruptions since the late 9th century, ended in the September 1962 revolution that created the Yemen Arab Republic. A civil war between Republicans and Royalists lasted until 1970.

Are all Zaydis Houthis? No. Zaydis make up roughly a third of Yemen’s population and the majority of Houthi supporters, but many Zaydi families, tribes, and scholars oppose the movement. Equating the two flattens a diverse community.

Further Listening & Reading

Hear Dr. Charles Schmitz explain the Zaydi roots of the movement and Egypt’s role in Yemen’s revolutions in the UME episode “Are Yemen’s Houthis An Iranian Creation?” on the Unraveling Middle East YouTube channel. Explore more scholar interviews through the Unraveling Middle East series and the wider History Behind News program, or subscribe to the UME email list on the homepage. For a connected background, read Strait of Hormuz: 500 Years of Empires Fighting Over One Waterway.

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